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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

I

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

t

DARRELL LAWRENCE WESSENDORF,

:

Case No. 880186-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of manslaughter in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-205 (Supp. 1987) following a
trial to the bench in Fifth District Court, in and for Washington
County, the Honorable J. Phillip Eves# Judge, presiding.

This

Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(e) (1987) and Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp.
1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the evidence established that defendant was

reckless in holding the snake in such proximity to the victim as
to allow it to strike, and is thus guilty of manslaughter.
2.

Whether the defendant should be excused from

responsibility in the homicide as the result of the medical
treatment provided to the victim in an effort to save her life.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Darrell Lawrence Wessendorf, was charged
with murder in the second degree in violation of Utah Code Ann.

S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1987).

He was convicted, following a bench

trial, of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, a second
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-205 (Supp.
1987).

He was sentenced to a term of not less than one nor more

than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison; he was also ordered
to pay $922 in restitution for the funeral expenses of Stevie
Kirkwood.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of May 7, 1987, Willis Kelton picked up
defendant at the home of Jeri Ann and Marshall Kirkwood in
LaVerkin, Utah, where defendant rented an upstairs room (T. 17,
381).

Kelton and defendant then traveled toward Cedar City to

pay an open container ticket when defendant spotted a great basin
rattlesnake coiled up beside the road (T. 20, 289, 388-89).

At

defendant's request, Kelton pulled over to the side of the road,
allowing defendant to capture the snake (T. 289, 389). Using a
jackhandle retrieved from Kelton's truck, defendant put pressure
on the snake's head and, after a short struggle, imprisoned the
snake in a plastic gunnysack (T. 289, 389).
Kelton and defendant then returned to the Kirkwood home
where defendant tied the sack containing the snake in a tree on
the east side of the house (T. 390). Defendant asked Ms.
Kirkwood, who had been observing defendant from the doorway of
her home, to move the sack to the other side of the tree if the
sun began to beat down on it (T. 19, 306, 390)•

Ms. Kirkwood

refused to even touch the sack and strongly suggested defendant
tie it to a tree on the south wide of the house (T. 19, 306,
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390).

After moving the snake, as requested by Ms. Kirkwood,

defendant and Kelton left for Cedar City a second time that
morning, somewhere between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m. (T. 391). Not
lohg after defendant and Kelton departed, Ms. Kirkwood left with
her daughter, Stevie, and a friend to spend a few hours in St.
George (T. 21, 395).
Upon arriving in Cedar City, defendant and Kelton took
care of their business at the police station and then stayed
around to "drag main" a couple of times (T. 391). On their way
out of town, defendant and Kelton stopped at the liquor store to
purchase a bottle of tequila (T. 392, 394). Defendant and Kelton
proceeded to share the bottle on their return to LaVerkin (T.
392).
When defendant arrived back at the Kirkwood home, he
released the snake (T. 310-311, 390). The snake was about fortytwo inches long; James LeRoy Glen, a research serpentologist with
the Veterans Administration Hospital, has "seen probably more
great basin rattlesnakes than anybody today that's alive," and
the largest one he has seen was forty-six inches (T. 486). The
snake tried to crawl off a few times and coiled up every time it
was approached by dogs running loose in the yard (T. 310-311).
As a result, defendant mostly sat with the snake coiled up
underneath his leg away from the dogs (T. 311, 394). Sitting out
under the shade tree, defendant and Kelton finished off the
bottle of tequila and waited for Ms. Kirkwood's return (T. 291,
394).
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Ms. Kirkwood returned home about 3:00 p.m. and was
confronted by defendant holding the snake with it hanging around
his neck and moving around his body (T. 21, 43, 395). Defendant
proceeded to tease Ms. Kirkwood in an attempt to get her to touch
or hold the snake.

Defendant persisted in this conduct even

after it became apparent that Ms. Kirkwood was frightened by the
snake (T. 21-22, 97-98, 291, 314-315, 395, 431).
In addition to Ms. Kirkwood, defendant approached
several friends and neighbors of Ms. Kirkwood, as well as
children just returning home from school (T. 23-26, 291-92, 313314, 395-99).

Concerned by defendant's conduct, Ms. Kirkwood

ordered her six year old son, Lyle, who had just returned home
from school, to go to a neighbor's house for safety (T. 23, 46,
292, 396, 431). Stevie, Ms. Kirkwood's 2-year-old daughter, was
told to go to her bedroom and play where she would be out of
sight of defendant (T. 47).
Ms. Kirkwood then walked across the street to the
Church residence (T. 25, 430). Defendant followed with the snake
draped across his neck (T. 98). Walter Church warned defendant
that the snake was dangerous and that Hit could bite and kill
someone" (T. 26, 83). Defendant disregarded this warning and
told Mr. Church not to worry about it (T. 397-98).

Allowing the

snake to crawl loose around his neck, defendant performed antics
with the snake for on-lookers who came along (T. 313, 398-99).
Later, when most everyone had gone, defendant took the
snake into the Kirkwood home over the objections of Ms. Kirkwood
(T. 28, 295, 399-401).

Defendant stood in the doorway of the
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Kirkwood home with the snake draped across his shoulders,
preventing Ms. Kirkwood access to the house unless she consented
to touch or hold the snake (T. 28, 295, 332). Because of her
concern for Stevie, Ms. Kirkwood ran around the house and climbed
through her bedroom window (T. 28-29, 295).
With the snake still draped across his shoulders,
defendant entered the Kirkwood home through the front entrance
and proceeded to the bathroom where Stevie was playing with a
kitten (T. 29, 295, 401-02, 429, 562). While Stevie was still
holding the kitten in her right hand, defendant took her left
hand and stroked the snake with it (T. 402). Stepping around
behind Stevie, defendant next draped the tail of the snake over
Stevie's left shoulder and the main body over Stevie's left arm
and hand (T. 402). Stevie screamed and tried to get away from
defendant (T. 296, 320). Defendant attempted to take the kitten
away from Stevie so that he could place both of her hands on the
snake and have Stevie kiss the snake (T. 369-70, 403, 426, 56667).

Defendant stuck the snake in her face and at times held the

snake's head within four inches of Stevie's face (T. 295, 321,
565).
Meanwhile, Ms. Kirkwood had obtained a gun from her
bedroom and had started toward the bathroom (T. 29). Upon seeing
the snake draped across Stevie, Ms. Kirkwood ordered defendant to
remove the snake immediately (T. 29, 35, 403-04, 430, 567).
Defendant ignored Ms. Kirkwood and continued to allow the snake
to stay on Stevie's shoulder.

Ms. Kirkwood demanded that

defendant remove the snake a second and third time (T. 35, 57).
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Finally, defendant turned to look at Ms. Kirkwood and felt the
snake "hunker up" in his hand (T. 404, 565-66).

By the time

defendant focused his attention back on Stevie, the snake had
attached to her neck (T. 30, 322, 336, 404-05, 565-66).

At that

moment, defendant's hand was at least four to five inches from
the snake's head (T. 565).
After realizing that Stevie had been bitten, defendant
peeled the snake's fangs out of her shoulder (T. 30, 366, 405).
After dropping the gun in the hallway, Ms. Kirkwood attempted to
retrieve her daughter, but defendant slammed shut the bathroom
door (T. 30, 405). Defendant lacerated Stevie's shoulder and
attempted to suck the snake venom from the wound (T. 405, 563).
Ms. Kirkwood immediately called the police and then went outside
and shot the snake (T. 30, 60, 407-08).

Upon hearing the shot,

defendant emerged from the house carrying Stevie (T. 31). Ms.
Kirkwood managed to free Stevie from defendant's grasp and placed
her in the car in preparation for the drive to the hospital (T.
31).

A scuffle developed between defendant and Kelton which

considerably delayed Ms. Kirkwood's departure (T. 31-33, 66,
410).

Ms. Kirkwood needed someone to assist her in getting to

the hospital and asked Kelton to go with her (T. 31, 67).
However, defendant attacked Kelton in an effort to prevent him
from going to the hospital with Ms. Kirkwood (T. 31, 67-68, 41213).

When Ms. Kirkwood attempted to assist Kelton, defendant

shoved her to the ground (T. 31, 68, 413). Officer Drolc arrived
in time to witness defendant's treatment of Ms. Kirkwood (T. 3132).

Defendant backed off, allowing Ms. Kirkwood and Kelton to

leave with Stevie for the hospital (T. 32).
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Upon Stevie's arrival in the emergency room, she was
treated by four physicians (T. 193). The doctors began the
administration of antivenin through an intravenous line; three
vials were put into the IV solution (T. 107-08).

Stevie showed

clinical signs of improvement, but then suddenly, prior to the
completion of the administration of the antivenin, suffered
respiratory and cardiac arrest.

Despite vigorous efforts to save

her life, Stevie Kirkwood died (T. 108, 195).
Dr. Edwin Sweeney, Utah State Medical Examiner,
conducted an autopsy and determined that the cause of death was
venomous snakebite (T. 160).
Defendant claimed at trial that if rattlesnakes are
"properly handled and [not] startled, that they're perfectly
harmless" (T. 387). However, defendant admitted that he knew the
snake was poisonous and that it could bite (T. 428). He
intentionally took the snake into the bathroom where Stevie was
playing with kittens and draped the snake across her shoulder (T.
428-29).
Defendant was aware that if the snake were startled, it
could strike (T. 434). He knew the snake had previously reacted
to animals; in fact, it had reacted to his dog, causing defendant
to "flip [the snake] in the head" (T. 434). Regardless, he
exposed the snake to Stevie while she was handling the kittens.
Defendant also claimed that he has never heard of
anyone dying from a rattlesnake bite (T. 436). He believed,
however, that a rattlesnake bite was like a "concentrated" bee
sting, and he had heard of people dying from bee stings (T. 436).
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Following the presentation of the evidence, the court
found defendant not guilty of second degree murder and found him
guilty of the crime of manslaughter (R. 260).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant was aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk in exposing the poisonous rattlesnake to the 21-month old
victim, Stevie Kirkwood, in this case.

Defendant disregarded the

risk when he draped the snake over Stevie's shoulder and stuck
the snake within four inches of her face.

Defendant knew the

snake was poisonous and in fact had been warned earlier that day
to get rid of the snake because it could kill someone.

Even when

viewed from defendant's stand point, an ordinary person would not
have failed to have perceived the risk.

Defendant's conduct

meets the standard of recklessness and he is, therefore, guilty
of manslaughter.
The cause of the child victim's death was rattlesnake
envenomation.

The snake bit Stevie as the direct result of

defendant's conduct.

Stevie was taken to the hospital for

treatment, but despite medical care from four physicians and a
host of supporting personnel, Stevie Kirkwood died.

Even if

there were intervening medical error, the error was not a defense
to defendant because he inflicted a mortal wound on Stevie
Kirkwood.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT
DEFENDANT RECKLESSLY CAUSED THE DEATH OF
STEVIE KIRKWOOD AND IS GUILTY OF
MANSLAUGHTER.
Defendant first claims that the death of Stevie
Kirkwood was an accident for which he is not criminally
responsible.

In the alternative, he contends that his conduct,

at most, constituted criminal negligence, and that he was
improperly convicted of manslaughter.
Defendant's argument that Stevie's death was purely an
accident for which he should not be held responsible (A.B. at 7)
is without merit.

As set forth in the statement of facts,

defendant was aware that the rattlesnake was poisonous.

He knew

that it was a wild animal and could strike at any time.

He held

the snake at its midsection within inches of Stevie, despite her
screams, and the snake bit her.

Defendant can hardly seriously

contend that this series of events was a fortuitous circumstance
or happening for which there was no human agency.

Defendant was

not engaging in an act which was lawful and lawfully done under a
reasonable belief that no harm was possible.

This incident was,

simply, not an accident for which defendant has no criminal
responsibility.
A person commits manslaughter if he "recklessly causes
the death of another.-

Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-205(1)(a) (Supp.

1987) • A person commits negligent homicide if "acting with
criminal negligence, [he] causes the death of another."
Code Ann. S 76-5-206 (1978).

Utah

The crimes are a second degree

felony and class A misdemeanor, respectively.
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The definitions of the mens rea elements for these
crimes are set-forth in Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103, which states,
in relevant part, that a person engages in conduct:
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with
respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when he
is aware of but consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he ought to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the circumstances exist or the result
will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
The Utah Supreme Court explained the distinction
between manslaughter and negligent homicide in State v. Dyer, 671
P.2d 142 (Utah 1983).

The Court stated:

The only difference between reckless and
criminally negligent conduct is that under
the former, one perceives a risk and
consciously disregards it, whereas under the
latter, one fails to even perceive the risk.
The risk in both cases must be of such a
degree that an ordinary person would not
disregard or fail to recognize it. The
distinction, then, is merely one of the
degree of the perception of the risk.
Id. at 148.

See also State v. Boqqess, 655 P.2d 654 (Utah 1982);

State v. Howard, 597 P.2d 878 (Utah 1979).
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In State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), the
Supreme Court found that the defendant had engaged in reckless
conduct as the result of placing or pulling a cord around the
victim's neck during sexual intercourse, a consensual act in an
apparent attempt to heighten sexual response.
intended no harm and there was no struggle.

The defendant

The defendant did

not possess medical knowledge which made him aware that the
victim's degree of intoxication could hasten her death.

The

Court found that the evidence did not support a conviction for
second-degree murder but did support a conviction for
manslaughter.

There was "sufficient evidence that the defendant

was aware of, but consciously disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that placing and/or pulling a cord around the
victim's neck would result in her death." Id. at 1219.

The Court

found the conduct to be a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise, even when viewed
from the defendant's standpoint.
The issue in this case is the degree to which defendant
perceived the risk—did he perceive a risk and disregard it, or
did he fail to even perceive the risk?
Defendant claims that he simply did not perceive the
risk, and bases his contention on his conduct in handling the
snake (AB at 13). Defendant's conduct in handling the snake,
however, does not establish that he failed to perceive the risk.
Defendant was aware of the risk; he knew the snake was poisonous
(T. 428), he knew the snake could strike at any time (T. 434),
and he knew that people react differently to envenomation. (T.
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437).

Defendant's conduct in handling the snake establishes that

he knew the risk and that he assumed it—not that he failed to
perceive a risk.

Because defendant was aware of and assumed the

risk, he was at least reckless in his conduct.
As the Supreme Court stated in Dyer, "the difference
[between negligent homicide and manslaughter] lies in making a
judgment as to where on a continuum of unreasonable conduct one's
behavior passes from negligence to recklessness."

Dyer at 148.

Additionally, one's "negligence may, in a particular case,
quickly, even imperceptibly, aggravate on the scale of
culpability to recklessness.

State v. Boggess, 655 P.2d 654

(Utah 1982)(Stewart, J., concurring) quoting People v. Stanfield,
36 NY.2d 467, 330 N.E.2d 75, 369 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1975).
The facts show defendant's conduct was reckless.
had been drinking.

He

The evidence is not clear as to precisely how

much he had to drink, but does establish that defendant and
Willis Kelton bought a bottle of tequila when they went to Cedar
City to pay their open container tickets and apparently drank it
all (T. 394). Defendant's consumption of alcohol likely caused
him to be less cautious and careful than he may have ordinarily
have been.

However, his consumption of alcohol does not in any

way minimize or excuse his behavior.
not a defense in this case.

Voluntary intoxication is

If Hrecklessness or criminal

negligence establishes an element of an offense and the actor is
unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his
unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1978).

See also State v. Royball, 710

P.2d 168 (Utah 1985); State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985).
-12-

Ms. Kirkwood testified that after defendant had
consumed the alcohol, defendant was acting "macho" and had to be
the "center of attention because he . . . had a deadly animal on
his shoulder just like Rambo would be packing a machine gun" (T.
18).

It appears from defendant's conduct that trying to be the

"center of attention" was precisely what he was doing.

Over a

period of more than an hour, defendant performed antics with the
snake.

He chased and taunted Ms. Kirkwood in an attempt to get

her to hold it—despite her obvious revulsion and fear (T. 2122).

He performed for the school kids getting off the bus (T.

313-14, 469). He asked Vaughn Gubler and Allen Shelly if they
wanted to hold the snake and called then "chicken" when they did
not (T. 25, 475). It appears that the reaction of the spectators
only exacerbated defendant's behavior.
Defendant knew the snake was poisonous (T. 428). He
also knew the snake could strike if startled (T. 434). He knew
the venom would cause physical effects; in fact, he carried a
"snakebite kit" in his truck (T. 406). His awareness is further
evidenced by the fact that immediately after the snake bit
Stevie, he lacerated the fang hole in an attempt to extract the
poison (T. 405, 428).
Defendant also knew the snake reacted to animals. He
had the snake near dogs earlier that day, which had caused the
snake to react (T. 434). Regardless, he took the snake into the
bathroom where Stevie was playing with kittens (T. 402). This
conduct further demonstrates defendant's knowledge of and
disregard of the risk involved.

-13-

Defendant claims that he has never heard of anyone
dying from a rattlesnake bite (T. 436). However, he admits that
he has heard of people dying from bee stings (T. 436). By his
owh admission, he believes that a rattlesnake bite is like a
"concentrated" bee sting and a person can become ill (T. 436).
He also knows that people react differently to bee stings, and
that some are more severely affected than others (T. 437). Also,
he admitted to the investigator for the medical examiner, when
interviewed soon after Stevie's death, that he was aware of the
deadly poisonous nature of the snake (T. 253, 255).
Consequently, defendant's attempt to minimize his knowledge
regarding the deadly nature of rattlesnake venom is not
persuasive.
Regardless of defendant's expressed belief concerning
the deadly nature of the snake, he was informed on the date of
the crime that the snake could kill.

Walter Church, Ms.

Kirkwood's neighbor from across the street, specifically warned
defendant that the snake could kill.

He told defendant that the

snake was dangerous and that it could bite and kill someone (T.
83).

He also told defendant that he should "do something about"

the snake (T. 83). Nevertheless, defendant ignored the warnings
and continued to engage in his reckless behavior.
Defendant further claims that because he was bitten by
a rattlesnake when he was a child of five years and suffered no
major ill-effects (although he was taken to the hospital), he
would not have known that this snake was dangerous (A.B. at 23;
T. 376-77).

However, the snake which bit defendant was a
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sidewinder and was only twelve to eighteen inches long (T. 378).
Furthermore, he was bitten on the finger (T. 378). The size of
the snake and the location of the bite are important factors. As
Mr. Glen, the research serpentologist, explained, the size of the
snake and the location of the bite are important to survival. If
a small child gets bitten on the trunk of the body or near the
neck, the chance of death is increased.

The snake in defendant's

possession was unusually large, measuring about forty-two inches
(T. 486). There is no question that defendant knew the age and
size of the child (T. 383). He also knew people react
differently to envenomation. (T. 437). Regardless, defendant
draped the snake over Stevie's shoulder, and, as Willis Kelton
put it, stuck the snake in her face (T. 295, 321). Further, he
held the snake only by its midsection (T. 254); he did not even
attempt to exercise control over the snake's ability to strike
out at Stevie.

He also looked away from Stevie, to look at Jeri,

allowing the snake to strike (T. 404). Defendant's argument that
he was unaware of the risk is not persuasive when juxtaposed to
his knowledge and behavior.
Defendant's expert witness testified that there have
been six deaths caused by rattle snake envenomation in the State
of Utah since 1900 (T. 489). The witness' testimony is
irrelevant to this defendant's state of mind at the time in
question.

Defendant did not have the benefit of these statistics

when his conduct caused the snake to bite Stevie.

Further,

despite the infrequency of death as the result of rattlesnake
bites, such deaths do, indeed, occur.
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The rattlesnake

envenomation was unquestionably the cause of death in this case
(T. 160, 226). Death from different kinds of poison may, indeed,
be rare.

However, it does not change the deadly nature of the

poison or justify one's needless exposure to the risk.

Defendant

did not have the benefit of his expert's statistics; he did,
however, have the benefit of knowing that the snake was
poisonous, that it could strike at any time, and that, as he put
it, a rattlesnake bite is a concentrated bee sting and even been
stings can be fatal.
Additionally, Mr. Glen, was given a hypotethical
question in which defendant's conduct in this case was presented
to him.

Based on his experience, Mr. Glen testified that

defendant's conduct created a substantial risk of death (T. 51819).
As the Supreme Court stated in State v. Howard, 597
P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979), the degree of the defendant's
perception of the risk and his subjective intent is a question of
fact to be determined by the trier of fact.
Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983).

See also State v.

In this case, the trial court,

sitting without a jury, determined that defendant did not
intentionally or with depraved indifference kill Stevie, but he
was reckless when engaging in the conduct that caused Stevie's
death (T. 2/24/88 at 6-7). The standard of review of verdicts
from bench trials is subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard,
rather than the standard for jury trials in which an appellate
court will overturn the verdict only when the evidence is so
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have
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reached the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Walker,

743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472 (Utah
App. 1987).

When examining the trial court's determination that

the evidence was sufficient to take defendant's conduct on the
continuum from negligence to recklessness, this Court should find
the evidence sufficient.

Given the sufficiency of the evidence

on this point, the trial was not "clearly erroneous" in finding
defendant's conduct met the standard for recklessness.
While the trial court's choice words may have been, on
occasion, confusing as the to legal standard he was applying in
finding defendant guilty of manslaughter, this Court should still
uphold the verdict.

When applying the standard for recklessness,

it becomes clear that the facts establish the requisite mens rea.
Even when viewed from defendant's standpoint, an ordinary person
would not have failed to have perceived the risk.

This Court

need not rely upon the trial court's choice of words in finding
defendant was reckless and can use any appropriate grounds to
uphold the verdict.

Jones v.State, 602 P.2d 378 (Wyo. 1979).

The State does not contend that defendant did not care
for Stevie or Ms. Kirkwood, or that he intended to cause her harm
or death.

However, the facts establish that he was aware of a

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
existed.

The risk was substantial; the snake was large and

poisonous and the child was small.
unjustifiable.

Further the risk was

Unlike driving a car or climbing a ladder as

defendant analogizes (AB at 22), defendant's conduct in thrusting
the snake in Stevie's face had absolutely no utility.
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The risk

was unjustifiable.

Defendant's conduct was a gross deviation

from the standard of care.

Even when viewed from the defendant's

standpoint, an ordinary person would not have failed to perceive
the risk.
When applying the standard for a determination of
recklessness, it becomes clear that, indeed, defendant's conduct
was, at a minimum, reckless.

When viewing the conduct on the

continuum spoken about the Dyer Court, it becomes clear that the
risk was more than something that defendant ought to have been
aware of.

He was, indeed, aware of the risk but chose to

disregard it.
POINT II
THE DEATH OF STEVIE KIRKWOOD RESULTED
PROXIMATELY FROM THE VENOMOUS SNAKEBITE, AND
THE MEDICAL INTERVENTION DOES NOT EXCUSE
DEFENDANT FROM HAVING CAUSED STEVIE'S DEATH.
Defendant contends that the medical treatment Stevie
Kirkwood received upon her admission to the hospital became an
intervening cause of her death and that the alleged negligence of
the treating physicians should constitute a defense to his
manslaughter conviction.

This contention is erroneous and is not

supported by the record or by controlling case law of this state.
Furthermore, State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah 1986),
established that even when there is medical error it is no
defense to a defendant who had inflicted a mortal wound.
In Utah, the State has the burden in a homicide case of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of the victim
resulted proximately from some act or omission of the defendant.
State v. Bassett, 27 Utah 2d 272, 274, 495 P.2d 318, 319 (1972).
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If the injury inflicted contributes immediately to the death of
the victim, the defendant is guilty of homicide.

State v.

Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 185, 603 P.2d 74, 77-78 (1979); Velarde at
456.
In this case, the State presented sufficient evidence
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's conduct in
allowing the poisonous snake to attach to Stevie's neck
contributed immediately to her death.

The medical examiner for

the State of Utah, Dr. Sweeney, testified that the cause of
Stevie's death was the venomous snake bite (T. 159-61).

In

addition, defendant's witness Dr. Dart, an attending physician
for the Arizona State Poison Control Center, also testified that
Stevie died from the snake bite (T. 218). The uncontroverted
testimony of these two witnesses demonstrates beyond a reasonable
doubt that Stevie died as a direct result of venomous snakebite.
Stevie was treated by four physicians and various other
medical personnel when she arrived at the hospital (T. 108). The
doctors exercised their best judgment, given the situation at the
time and the clinical signs of improvement after administration
of the antivenin (T. 121, 131). Even according to defendant's
expert witness, the medical personnel did not do anything to
cause Stevie's death (T. 222), the slow administration of the
antivenin was an acceptable medical practice (T. 202-03), and
that there was no gross negligence (T. 237).
However, even if this Court should construe the care
Stevie received at the hospital as a contributing factor to her
death, defendant remains responsible.
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"[IIntervening medical

error is not a defense to a defendant who has inflicted a mortal
wound upon another."

Velarde at 456.

Defendant asserts that Velarde is not applicable here
and attempts to distinguish it from the instant facts on the
ground that the venomous snake bite should not have been a mortal
wound.

Although the evidence adduced at trial does suggest that

a rattlesnake bite may not be as fatal as is popularly believed,
defendant's assertion fails as applied to the particular facts of
this case.

Both Dr. Dart and Dr. Callahan testified regarding

the increased danger of a snake bite to a small child.
Defendant's witness, Dr. Dart, stated that he would expect a
child in the ten to fifteen kilogram range, like Stevie, to be at
a "substantial risk of death" (T. 255). Similarly, State's
witness, Dr. Callahan, stated that the smaller the body of the
victim, the greater the danger of death from envenomization. (T.
110-11).

Additionally, the research serpentologist, James LeRoy

Glen, testified about the increased risk for children (T. 493).
Nonetheless, defendant attempts to distinguish Velarde from the
present facts asserting that the victim in Velarde would have
died regardless of whether he received medical treatment.
Defendant asserts that Stevie might have survived with different
medical treatment and therefore he is not responsible for her
death.

However, in this case, as in Velarde, subsequent medical

treatment simply failed to preserve the victim's life.

The mere

possibility that different medical treatment might have brought
about a different result is too uncertain a foundation to support
defendant'8 contention that the snakebite should not have been a
mortal wound.
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Based upon the above, Velarde is dispositive of the
issue here.

The alleged medical error of the treating physicians

does not constitute a defense for defendant.

Once a defendant

inflicts a mortal wound, he is not entitled to the benefit of
medical science—even at its most basic level—to reverse the
chain of events he has set into motion.
Courts in other jurisdictions have also examined this
issue, and some have determined that the adequacy of a victim's
medical care may have some relevance under limited circumstances.
The Supreme Court of Arizona considered the issue of medical
malpractice in State v. Sauter, 120 Ariz. 222, 585 P.2d 242
(1978).
M

. . . [I]t is the generally recognized
principle that where a person inflicts upon
another a wound which is dangerous, that is,
calculated to endanger or destroy life, it is
alleged no defense to a charge of homicide
that the victim's death was contributed to
by, or immediately resulted from, unskillful
or improper treatment of the wound or injury
by the attending physicians or surgeons."
Id. at 243, quoting People v. Stamps, 8 Ill.App.3d 896, 291
N.E.2d 274, 279-80 (1972).
The Sauter court further stated that only if the death
of the victim is attributable solely to the medical malpractice
and is not induced at all by the original wound will the
intervening treatment constitute a defense.

Id. at 244

(citations omitted).
The Supreme Court of Colorado requires that the
intervening medical treatment constitute gross negligence before
it is available as a defense for the defendant.
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[MJere negligence on the part of the
attending physician does not constitute a
defense. . . . [M]ere medical negligence can
reasonably be foreseen. We hold, however
that gross negligence is abnormal human
behavior, would not be reasonably
foreseeable, and would constitute a defense,
if, but for that gross negligence, death
would not have resulted.
People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316, 319
(1975)(emphasis added).
The reasoning set forth in both Sauter and Calvaresi
suggests that some degree of a doctor's negligence is foreseeable
and cannot be used by a defendant to exonerate himself on the
ground that different or more skillful treatment might have
preserved the victim's life.

Only if the doctor's care is

grossly negligent and is the actual cause of death, is the
medical treatment a possible defense.
The State proved all elements of manslaughter beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Defendant has not shown that the care Stevie

received at the hospital contributed solely to her death or
constituted gross negligence.

The record in this case does not

support such an argument.
Dr. Foxley and Dr. Callahan implemented what in their
judgment seemed the safest course of treatment for the snakebite
only after careful consideration of several factors, including
Stevie's size, and the threat of anaphylactic shock from the
antivenin increases if too much antivenin was administered too
quickly (T. 105, 240-41).

Therefore, three vials of antivenin

were prepared for initial administration through the intravenous
line, with the intention of administering additional antivenin as
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needed (T. 11-17).

After this initial dosage, Stevie gradually

improved in general appearance and quieted down (T. 108). She
was then transferred from the emergency room to an intensive care
unit (T. 111-17, 132-33).

Shortly thereafter, Stevie suffered

respiratory arrest (T. 108, 173).
Defendant also claims that improper intubation was an
intervening cause of Stevie's death.

Michael Kesler, a

registered nurse anesthetist, was called to the ICU to intubate
Stevie to guard her airway during the respiratory arrest (T.
173).

Mr. Kesler testified concerning the procedural protocol

involved in intubating a patient to guard against improper
placement of the tube.

Imediately after intubation occurs, Mr.

Kesler routinely checks the patient for proper chest movement (T.
177-78).

When he is satisfied with that, Mr. Kesler checks to

see if the stomach is distended (T. 183). He then listens to
both sides of the lungs for breath sounds (T. 178, 182-83).

In

addition to these precautions, Mr. Kesler checks the endotracheal
tube itself for signs of humidification and condensation which
show that the patient's breathing is normal (T. 183). Mr. Kesler
routinely performs these safety procedures after he completes an
intubation and before the tube is taped in place (T. 178, 18283).
Mr. Kesler followed the requisite procedures in this
case (T. 182-83).

Dr. Callahan also checked Stevie to make sure

the intubation was done correctly (T. 151). Even defendant's
witness, Dr. Dart, testified that Kesler followed the correct
procedures and there is no evidence that Kesler improperly
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intubated Stevie (T. 218-19).

The blood gas tests indicated that

Stevie was in distress (T. 212). However, improper intubation
was only one possibility, and there could be other explanations
as well (T. 213). According to Kesler, the blood gas tests were
a reflection of the horrible condition Stevie was in and were not
necessarily an indication that the tube had slipped into her
stomach (T. 179-180).
Upon reviewing Stevie's care at the hospital,
defendant's witness, Dr. Dart, testified that the treating
physicians had done nothing that would have caused Stevie's death
(T. 222). Dr. Dart further testified that the slow
administration of the antivenin was an acceptable medical
practice and that the care of the physicians did not constitute
gross negligence (T. 202-03, 237). With the benefit of
hindsight, the treating physicians may have done things
differently.

However, defendant was not entitled to the benefit

of any medical intervention to stop the chain of events he set
into motion when he caused the mortal wound.

That the physicians

intervened but did not save Stevie's life does not lesson
defendant's capability or mitigate his reckless conduct.
CONCLUSION
The defendant, Darrell Lawrence Wessendorf, was
properly convicted of manslaughter.

For the foregoing reasons

and any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State
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of Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's
conviction.
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